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The DSM is the main classification of mental disorders used by psychiatrists in the United States and, 
increasingly, around the world. Although widely used, the DSM has come in for fierce criticism, with 
many commentators believing it to be conceptually flawed in a variety of ways. This paper assesses 
some of these philosophical worries. The first half of the paper asks whether the project of 
constructing a classification of mental disorders that ‘cuts nature at the joints’ makes sense. What is 
mental disorder? Are types of mental disorder natural kinds (that is, are the distinctions between 
them objective and of fundamental theoretical importance, as are, say, the distinctions between the 
chemical elements)? The second half of the paper addresses epistemic worries. Even if types of 
mental disorder are natural kinds there may be reason to doubt that the DSM will come to reflect 
their natural structure. In particular, I examine the extent to which the DSM is theory-laden, and look 
at how it has been shaped by social and financial factors. Ultimately, I conclude that although the 
DSM is of immense practical importance it is not likely to become the best possible classification of 
mental disorders.  
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The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (known as the D.S.M.) is published by the 
American Psychiatric Association (A.P.A.), and is the main classification of mental disorders used by 
psychiatrists in the United States and, increasingly, around the world. Although widely used, the 
D.S.M. has come in for fierce criticism, with many commentators believing it to be conceptually 
flawed in a variety of ways. This paper assesses some of these philosophical worries. The first half of 
the paper asks whether the project of constructing a classification of mental disorders that 'cuts nature 
at the joints' makes sense. What is mental disorder? Are types of mental disorder natural kinds (that is 
are the distinctions between them objective and of fundamental theoretical importance, as are, say, the 
distinctions between the chemical elements)? The second half of the paper addresses epistemic 
worries. Even if types of mental disorder are natural kinds there may be reason to doubt that the 
D.S.M. will come to reflect their natural structure. In particular, I examine the extent to which the 
D.S.M. is theory-laden, and look at how it has been shaped by social and financial factors. Ultimately, 
I conclude that although the D.S.M. is of immense practical importance it is not on track to become 
the best possible classification of mental disorders. 
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1.     What is mental disorder? 
  
The introduction to the D.S.M.-III (1980) includes the following definition of mental disorder: 
...each of the mental disorders is conceptualized as a clinically significant behavioural or 
psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is typically associated 
with either a painful symptom (distress) or impairment in one or more areas of functioning 
(disability). In addition there is an inference that there is a behavioural, psychological, or 




With minor revisions this claim is also made in the D.S.M.-III-R. (1987), the D.S.M.-IV (1994) and 
the D.S.M.-IV-T.R (2000). Here, I shall examine whether this definition is conceptually adequate.  
  
The D.S.M. definition of mental disorder was born out of the 1970s debates over 
homosexuality.  Until 1973 homosexuality was listed as a mental disorder in the D.S.M.-II, a fact that 
roused great hostility from the gay community.
[2]
 In 1970 gay rights protesters mobbed the A.P.A. 
annual meeting in San Francisco, shouting down speakers with whom they disagreed and disrupting 
much of the meeting. Protests continued throughout 1971 and 1972. Robert Spitzer, who would later 
become chairman of the D.S.M.-III committee, became involved in the debates and found defining 
'disorder' to be a useful way of defending his stance on homosexuality.
[3]
 Spitzer suggested that 
homosexuality per se is not a disorder but that a diagnosis should be included for homosexuals who 
experience distress concerning their sexual orientation. Such a proposal was politically useful because 
it found some middle ground between those who considered homosexuality to be a mental disorder 
and those who considered it a normal variant of human sexuality. To defend his stance, Spitzer 
formulated a definition of mental disorder that he claimed was satisfied by all the conditions in the 
D.S.M.-II with the exception of homosexuality. According to Spitzer's definition a condition can only 
be a mental disorder if it causes distress or disability. As many homosexuals experience no distress or 
disability, homosexuality in and of itself cannot be a disorder. However, those people who are 
distressed about their sexual orientation can be considered to suffer from a disorder and are 
appropriately treated by psychiatrists. Spitzer's position came to be adopted by the A.P.A. in 1973, 
when homosexuality was removed as a diagnosis from the D.S.M.-II and 'Sexual Orientation 
Disorder', a diagnosis for homosexuals who are unhappy about being gay, was added.  
  
In due course, a version of Spitzer's definition came to be included in the D.S.M.-III. In a 
series of articles, Jerome Wakefield has convincingly argued that the core idea behind the D.S.M. 
definition is that diseases are harmful dysfunctions, where 'dysfunction' is to be understood in an 
evolutionary sense.
[4]
 (In the literature concerning the definition of mental disorder, 'disease' and 
'disorder' are used interchangeably). According to this account, being an evolutionary dysfunction is 
necessary but insufficient for a condition to be a disease. For homosexuality to be a disorder it would 
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have to be both an evolutionary dysfunction and also harmful.  
  
Here, however, I shall argue that the claim that diseases are harmful dysfunctions cannot be 
accepted because evolutionary dysfunction is not even necessary for disease. The problem with the 
D.S.M. definition is that the genetic bases of some conditions that we would normally class as 
diseases may confer an evolutionary advantage. Evolutionary psychologists have been struck by the 
fact that many mental diseases appear to have a genetic basis and yet occur at prevalence rates that are 
too high to be solely the result of mutations. Examples include manic-depression, sociopathy, 
obsessive-compulsivity, anxiety, drug abuse, and some personality disorders.
[5]
 This means that the 
genetic bases of these mental diseases must be promoted by natural selection, which implies that the 
genes are adaptive in some way or other. In such cases, from an evolutionary point of view, there may 
be no dysfunction when cases of the disease occur. The claim that a disease is a harmful dysfunction 
must be rejected, and a new account of disease is required.  
  
I suggest that a tidy definition of 'disease' cannot be achieved. By 'disease' we aim to pick out 
a variety of conditions that through being painful, disfiguring or disabling are of interest to us as 
people. This class of conditions is by its nature anthropocentric and corresponds to no natural class of 
conditions in the world. I suggest that by disease we mean a condition that it is a bad thing to have, 
that is such that we consider the afflicted person to be unlucky, and that can potentially be medically 
treated. All three criteria must be fulfilled for a condition to be a disease. The criterion that for a 
condition to be a disease it must be a bad thing is required to distinguish the biologically different 
from the diseased. The claim that the sufferer must be unlucky is needed to distinguish diseases from 
conditions that are unpleasant but normal, for example teething. Finally, the claim that for a condition 
to be a disease it must be potentially medically treatable is needed to distinguish diseases from other 
types of misfortune, for example economic problems and legal problems.
[6] 
  
If the definition of disease used by the D.S.M. must be rejected, what implications does this 
have for the D.S.M? Does it imply that the D.S.M. includes the wrong class of conditions? I suggest 
that the implications for the D.S.M. are limited. There is reason to doubt the extent to which decisions 
to include particular conditions in the D.S.M. were influenced by accounts of disease. Letters in the 
A.P.A. archives do not argue that conditions should be included because they are diseases or excluded 
because they are not diseases. Rather correspondents argue that a diagnosis should be included 
because psychiatrists see patients with the condition, or that the condition is required for insurance 
purposes, or that research on the condition is being carried out. This suggests that accounts of disease 
may have been little used in deciding which conditions to include in the D.S.M. During the 1970s and 
1980s, in public, the A.P.A. found defining disease a useful rhetorical strategy. Defining disease was 
useful both in the debates over homosexuality and in attempts to defend psychiatry against anti-
psychiatric claims that psychiatrists merely treat problems in living. However, this public interest is 
compatible with A.P.A. committees paying little attention to accounts of disease behind closed doors.  
  
Recently it seems that the A.P.A. has begun to lose interest in defining disease even for 
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rhetorical effect. Concerns regarding homosexuality and anti-psychiatry were peculiar to a 
specific time in American history, and have now largely vanished. Right on cue the A.P.A. has started 
to loose interest in defining disease. The D.S.M-IV and the D.S.M.-IV-TR define disorder but 
comment that 'no definition adequately specifies precise boundaries for the concept "mental disorder'' 
and admit that 'the definition of mental disorder that was included in D.S.M.-III and D.S.M.-III-R. is 
presented here because it is as useful as any other available definition'.
[7]
 These comments scarcely 
give the impression that defining disorder was considered of much importance by the committees 
responsible for the most recent editions of the D.S.M. 
  
If I am right and the A.P.A. is loosing interest in defining disease then I suggest that this is a 
pity for two major reasons. First, a good account of disease can be helpful in determining which 
conditions should be considered to be diseases. Hypomania is an example of a condition that has 
plausibly been wrongly listed in the D.S.M. as a disorder (according to both the D.S.M. account of 
disorder and my own). Hypomanic episodes are characterised by a mood that is 'unusually good, 
cheerful, or high...The expansive quality of the mood disturbance is characterized by enthusiasm for 
social, interpersonal, or occupational interactions.'
[8]
 The person may have a decreased need for sleep 
and be more talkative than normal. Hypomanic episodes are distinguished from manic episodes in 
that there is no, or little, impairment in the person's social or occupational functioning, and there are 
no psychotic features. Quite simply a hypomanic episode is generally a great thing to experience. 
Many psychiatrists believe that it is important to record hypomanic episodes because if a depressed 
person has been hypomanic in the past then this can have implications for their treatment. I have no 
quarrel with such claims. However, I suggest that hypomania in and of itself should not be considered 
to be a disease because it is not a bad thing to have.  
  
Second, developing an account of disease is important because it is relevant to the discussion 
of various social and political issues. Take, for example, the question of who should determine 
whether a condition is a disease. Depending on the account of disease adopted, different answers to 
this question will seem attractive. If whether a condition is a disease is thought to depend on 
biological facts, then it will seem appropriate for experts in biology to determine which conditions are 
diseases. In contrast, I have argued that whether a condition is a disease is in part a value-judgement. 
As physicians are not experts in making value-judgements, it follows from my account that it is not 
appropriate for them alone to decide which conditions are diseases. Similarly, an account of disease 
will be of use in determining whether, and why, diseased people should be eligible for various 
benefits, or excused from wrongdoing, although exploring such issues is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  
  
2. Are types of mental disorder natural kinds? 
  
Whether a condition is a disorder is partly a value-judgement, but the distinctions between types of 
mental disorder might still depend solely on psychological and biological facts. If this were the case 
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then the domain of mental disorders would be analogous to the domain of weeds. Weeds are 
unwanted plants, thus whether a daisy is a weed is at least in part a value judgement. Still the 
distinctions between kinds of plants generally considered weeds, such as those between dandelions 
and thistles, are fixed by the nature of the world. A fundamental assumption of the D.S.M. project is 
that empirical research can tell us how mental disorders ought to be classified. When the A.P.A. 
committees developed the D.S.M.-IV they reviewed thousands of empirical studies.
[9]
 These studies 
examined matters such as the biochemical correlates of disorders, how people with different disorders 
respond to particular treatments, and whether a particular disorder disproportionately affects people of 
a certain age or sex. The assumption is that by examining all this data it will be possible to construct a 
classification system that at least approximately reflects the true natural similarities and differences 
between cases of mental illness.  
  
The similarities and differences between types of mental disease are assumed to be not only 
objective but also of great significance to psychiatric theory. This is why psychiatric research 
generally examines groups of patients with the same diagnosis; these patients are assumed to be 
similar in some fundamental way. It is supposed that fundamentally different pathological processes 
underlie different disorders, and that different disorders can best be treated in different ways.  
  
Thus the A.P.A. can be seen as aiming to produce a classification system very much like those 
found in biology or chemistry. Like the differences between the chemical elements and biological 
species, the differences between types of mental disorder are thought to be objective and theoretically 
important. In short, mental disorders are assumed to be 'natural kinds'. 'Natural kind' is a technical 
term used by philosophers to refer to the kinds of thing or stuff studied by the natural sciences. 
Sodium, fleas, dandelions, and electrons are all examples of natural kinds. Members of a natural kind 
are thought to be naturally similar to each other because they are alike at a fundamental level. Fleas, 
for example, are all similar in that they jump, drink blood, and are poisoned by flea-spray, and fleas 
are alike in these respects because they are similar in some more fundamental way, they are all 
genetically similar.   
  
In this section I examine whether types of mental disorder are plausibly natural kinds. First, I 
refute arguments that claim to show that types of mental disorder cannot be natural kinds. Second, I 
consider whether some kinds of mental disorder actually are natural kinds. 
  
2.1 Arguments against mental disorders being natural kinds 
  
Two arguments are commonly put forward for the claim that types of mental disorder cannot be 
natural kinds. Here I refute them both. 
  
  
a. The Historical Argument 
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Some recent work in the history of medicine has aimed to show how disease entities have been 
constructed via the interaction of various technologies, institutions, and social interests. To take an 
example, in The Harmony of Illusions Allan Young claims to show how Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder arose out of the interaction of lobbying by Vietnam veterans, and the various tests and 
treatment programmes which arose for diagnosing and treating the disorder. Young and the authors of 




There are two possible ways of replying to such arguments and the appropriate response 
varies from case to case. First, one can agree that the disease has been created but argue that natural 
kinds can be artificial in this sense. The key to seeing that natural kinds can be artificially created is to 
remember that the 'natural' in 'natural kind' should be read as in 'natural law' rather than as in 'present 
in the Garden of Eden'. Plutonium is an example of a manufactured natural kind, and doubtless some 
highly 'social' story could be told concerning its creation. Artificially produced diseases, for example, 
types of drug addiction and, arguably, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder could similarly be both 
artificially manufactured and natural kinds. 
  
Second, one can insist that the disease has always existed and that it is only the means of 
recognising it that have been invented. This is a plausible response when retrospectively the disease 
can be seen to have afflicted people throughout history. For  
example, R.Daly has claimed that the mental symptoms recorded in Samuel Pepys' diary indicate that 
he suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder after having witnessed the Great Fire of London.
[11]
 
Given such evidence it can plausibly be claimed that people have always suffered from Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder. On such a view, rather than Young having documented the social factors 
that led to the construction of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder he has just documented the social 
factors that led to the condition being diagnosed.
[12]
 As a consequence, historical arguments such as 
Young's fail to demonstrate that a disease is not a natural kind. 
  
b. Hacking's Argument 
  
In a series of papers written between 1986 and 1995 Ian Hacking developed an argument that 
purports to show that types of mental disorder cannot be natural kinds.
[13]
 More recently Hacking 
seems to have changed his mind and, although he never gives reasons for rejecting his old argument, 
a chapter of his The Social Construction of What? (2000) discusses the possibility that at least some 
mental disorders might be natural kinds. Here I am concerned only with Hacking's earlier work. There 
Hacking argues that classifying and describing kinds of people (he refers to these as 'human kinds') 
results in feedback that alters the very kinds under study. People care how they are classified. As a 
result they are motivated to attempt to alter the ways in which they are classified and, as their 
behaviour changes, so do the phenomena under investigation. This feedback results in human kinds 
having histories totally unlike the histories of natural kinds, leading Hacking to conclude that human 
kinds are not natural kinds. Here I will argue that Hacking's argument fails and that he has not shown 
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that types of mental disorder cannot be natural kinds. 
  
I accept that feedback occurs when human kinds are classified, as Hacking describes. 
However, our classificatory practices also result in feedback that alters some natural kinds.
[14]
 For 
example, the characteristics of domestic livestock change over time because particular animals are 
classified as being the 'Best in Show' and are used in selective breeding. The occurrence of feedback 
does not distinguish human kinds from natural kinds. 
  
When faced with such examples, Hacking claims that the feedback that affects human kinds is 
importantly different because it occurs as a result of subjects becoming aware of the ways in which 
they are being described and judged.
[15]
 This idea needs working on before it can become an 
argument that human kinds cannot be natural kinds. Why does Hacking think that feedback that 
occurs as a result of subjects' ideas is metaphysically significant in a way that feedback caused by, 
say, selective breeding is not?  
Idea-dependence might be thought to matter because it betrays the subjective nature of a kind. 
The argument then would be that while natural kinds are objective, human kinds are affected by ideas 
and so subjective, and that thus human kinds cannot be natural kinds. Hacking gives no indication 
that this is a route he would wish to go down; however it is the most obvious option for someone who 
wishes to claim that idea-dependence is metaphysically significant and so worth pursuing here. 
  
Entities can be idea-dependent in fundamentally different senses, however, not all of which 
are indicative of subjectivity. Beauty, they say, is in the eye of the beholder. Indeed, it is easy to 
imagine that a woman wearing ornate false eyelashes may appear beautiful one year and absurd the 
next, depending on the whims of fashion. In this case the 'change', from beautiful to absurd, is a 
relational change only – it is brought about by a change in the viewer rather than by a change in the 
woman. Such idea-dependence indeed shows that a kind, such as beautiful women, is subjective and 
thus cannot be a natural kind. 
  
However, there is also another sort of idea-dependence. Imagine that the woman starts 
wearing false eyelashes because she reads that they are this season's essential accessory. Here ideas 
regarding beauty have affected her. They are part of the causal story that culminates in her wearing 
false eyelashes. However, the resulting change is perfectly objective. She used not to wear false 
eyelashes, now she does. Idea-dependence of this causal type results in objective changes in entities 
and is compatible with a kind, such as women who wear false eyelashes, being objective. Indeed, 
there might be interesting laws concerning such kinds, for example, conceivably, "Women who wear 
false eyelashes are more likely to get eye infections". 
  
Hacking has shown that human kinds are affected by ideas. In order to show that human kinds 
are subjective he also needs to show that human kinds are affected by ideas in a way that results in 
relational as opposed to genuine changes.  Hacking's examples, however, appear to be of cases where 
ideas produce genuine changes in peoples' behaviour. His most detailed case study concerns Multiple 




 The first patients diagnosed with Multiple Personality Disorder 
tended to have only two or three different personalities. Over time, however, more and more 
flamboyant cases started to appear on American chat shows – these patients had scores of different 
personalities, personalities of the opposite sex, and animal personalities. Hacking argues that as a 
result more and more patients started presenting with similar symptoms. Popular ideas about Multiple 
Personality Disorder affected the symptoms typical of patients. Nonetheless, it seems that the changes 
in patients' symptoms were genuine; patients really did start barking. In order to show that the 
changes in the symptoms of Multiple Personality Disorder indicate that it is a subjective kind and so 
not a natural kind Hacking would need to show that the changes in symptoms were not genuine, and 
he makes no suggestion that this is the case. Thus, I conclude that Hacking has failed to show that 
types of mental disorder cannot be natural kinds. Having refuted common arguments that purport to 
show that mental diseases cannot be natural kinds it is now time to move on and consider whether it 
is likely that at least some mental diseases actually are natural kinds. 
  
2.2 Are types of mental disorder natural kinds? 
  
So far the examples of natural kinds considered - biological species, chemical elements, types of 
fundamental particle - have all been types of thing or stuff. Types of mental disorder should not be 
thought of in this way but should instead be thought of as types of process. Accounts of natural kinds 
can be readily adapted to deal with natural kinds of process. One can say that instances of a natural 
kind of process will all be fundamentally similar to each other so long as they are at the same stage. 
In addition to types of disease, natural kinds of process might include particular chemical reactions, 
for example rusting, and biological processes, for example the metamorphosis of some particular 
species of caterpillar into a butterfly.  
  
In order for types of mental disease to be natural kinds it must be the case that instances of the 
disease are all similar to each other in some fundamental sense. Unfortunately many mental disorders 
are insufficiently well-understood for it to be possible to know whether or not this criterion is met. 
Plausibly, however, there are at least some mental disorders that meet this condition. Take 
Huntington's Chorea, for example. Huntington's Chorea is caused by a single dominant gene on 
chromosome four. Symptoms generally appear in middle-age and include jerky involuntary 
movements, behavioural changes, and progressive dementia. Plausibly Huntington's Chorea is a 
natural kind of mental disorder; in all cases an identical underlying property, the defective gene, 
produces characteristic symptoms. 
  
In addition to some mental diseases being natural kinds, it is likely that some will be, what I 
shall call, 'partial kinds'. Diseases will be partial kinds when cases of the disease are similar to each 
other in some, but not all, fundamental respects.  To take a fairly well-understood physical disease as 
an example, cases of meningitis caused by different viruses have different causes although the 
remainder of the disease process is very similar. When a disease forms a partial kind, cases of the 
disease will be similar to each other in many, but not all, respects.  
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I suggest that some types of mental disorder will turn out to be natural kinds, and that others 
will turn out to be partial kinds. In addition there will almost certainly be some categories of mental 
disorder that are neither, that is mental disorders where cases do not possess any similar fundamental 
properties at all. Most obviously 'rag-bag' diagnoses included in the D.S.M, such as 'Sexual Disorder 
Not Otherwise Specified' will fall into this category, as there is no reason to think that cases that 
receive such a diagnosis will be similar to each other in any interesting way. In addition, future 
research may well find that cases receiving other more 'respectable' diagnoses actually have nothing 




To conclude this section, I have refuted arguments that purport to show that mental disorders 
cannot be natural kinds, and I have suggested that at least some types of mental disorder actually are 
natural kinds. Thus, it makes sense for psychiatrists to try to discover what these natural kinds are 
through empirical research. The next two sections consider whether it is likely that a future edition of 
the D.S.M. will contain categories that map onto these natural kinds. Two potential sources of 
difficulty will be considered. These arise from the possibility that observation in psychiatry is theory-
laden, and from the fact that the D.S.M. is affected by pressures that emerge from the various ways in 
which it is used in practice. 
  
3. The problem of theory ladenness 
  
If observation is theory-laden then this might give us reason to doubt that the categories included in 
the D.S.M. will correspond to natural kinds of disorder. There is a danger that much current 
psychiatric theory is wrong. If so, and if observation in psychiatry is theory-laden, then psychiatrists' 
false beliefs could be expected to distort their observations of their patients and prevent them from 
seeing the true similarities and differences between types of mental disorder.  
  
Three distinct claims can be teased out from the general thought that observation is in some 
sense theory-laden. First, perception itself might be theory-laden, where 'perception' here refers to the 
immediate awareness an organism has of the world.  Second, the language in which observation 
reports are couched might be theory-laden. As a result scientists holding different theories, although 
perceiving the same thing, would produce observation statements that differ in meaning. Third, where 
scientists choose to direct their attention might be determined by their theoretical beliefs about what is 
important. Scientists with different theories would seek out different stimuli and so make different 
observations. I will examine each of these three claims in turn.  
  
3.1 Is perception theory-laden? 
  
There are experiments that indicate that what a subject perceives is affected by their expectations 
under certain conditions. Bruner and Postman's anomalous playing card experiment and Stratton's 
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inverting lenses experiment are the classic examples.
[18]
 However, there are problems with 
extrapolating from these experiments to claim that perception in psychiatry is theory-laden. 
  
Clinical case studies of people who have suffered brain lesions suggest that different types of 
perception are dependent on different areas of the brain. One of the most discussed cases concerns a 
patient, D.F., who suffered brain damage as a result of carbon monoxide poisoning.
[19]
 D.F. is 
unable to recognise objects, places, or people, as she is unable to discriminate size, shape or 
orientation. However, D.F. can still perform actions that require perceptual information. For example, 
although incapable of stating the orientation of a letter-box type slot, D.F. can reach to insert her hand 
through the slot with her hand correctly positioned. She can make use of perceptual information to 
guide her actions although being unable to recognise objects. Conversely, other brain-damaged 
patients have problems grasping objects but are able to recognise them.
[20]
 This suggests that 
perception-for-recognition and perception-for-action are processed in different parts of the brain. 
  
Some experiments suggest that perception-for-action does not employ top-down processing. 
When subjects reach for the central line of a Müller-Lyer figure their grasp aperture corresponds to 
the actual rather than to the perceived size of the line.
[21]
 Similar results have been gained with 
Titchener circles (the illusion in which the apparent size of a central circle depends on the size of the 
circles surrounding it).
[22]
 These illusions are generally thought to occur as a side effect of top-down 
processing. As perception-for-action is not vulnerable to the illusions this suggests that perception-
for-action does not employ top-down processing and thus will not be theory-laden. 
  
It is also likely that face recognition (e.g. recognising Tony Blair) depends on a distinct 
perception-processing system. Evidence for this hypothesis comes mainly from the clinical condition 
of prosopagnosia, in which patients cannot recognise faces but can recognise other stimuli. There are 
also cases of brain-damaged people who can recognise faces but are unable to recognise facial 
expressions.
[23]
 These people can recognise a photo as being of Tony Blair, but they are unable to 
tell whether he is happy, angry, or bored. This suggests that the perceptual-system that recognises 
facial expressions is different to that which recognises faces.  
  
That different types of perception are processed differently in different areas of the brain 
means that it is possible that some types of perception are theory-laden while other types are not 
theory-laden. For the most part, the descriptions of conditions included in the D.S.M. are based on 
psychiatrists' observations of psychiatric patients. Thus we must ask whether perceptions of people 
are affected by theoretical beliefs.  
  
Psychological studies examining this question are scarce. However, some studies have 
examined the effects of contextual information on subjects' perceptions of emotions. Psychiatrists 
have various theoretical beliefs concerning the emotions that are likely to be manifested by different 
types of psychiatric patients, and so these studies are of interest here. In the studies, subjects are 
shown a face, for example a woman crying, and are given information regarding the context, for 
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example they might be told that the women has been given a present, and then they are asked 
to judge the emotion that the person is probably experiencing. Unfortunately the results of 
experiments have been inconsistent. Fernández-Dols and Carroll (1997) review eighteen studies. 
Seven of these found that subjects' perceptions were unaffected by the contextual information, while 
the others found that the contextual information had some effect. No overall conclusion can be drawn 
from the series. The final conclusion of this sub-section is that whether our perceptions are theory-
laden is not, as is often assumed, a closed question, but on the contrary should continue to be a live 
issue.  
  
3.2 Are Observation Reports Necessarily Theory-Laden? 
  
Those philosophers who claim that language is necessarily theory-laden claim that the meanings of 
the terms used in an observation statement are at least partially dependent on theory. To use Popper's 
example, suppose someone reports 'Here is a glass of water'.
[24]
 This might seem like a 
straightforward observation-statement. However, Popper claims that it is part of the meaning of 'glass' 
and of 'water' that these are kinds of stuff that show law-like behaviour. If it turned out, for example, 
that the stuff in the glass was actually inflammable then that would show that it was not, after all, 
water. Thus 'Here is a glass of water' is not merely a report of what is seen, but assumes much 
theoretical knowledge.  
  
However, in his 1971 paper 'Theory and Observation' Ernst Nagel argues that the theory-
ladenness of observation-statements need cause no problems in practice. Nagel accepts that 
observation-statements presuppose various theories and background information. Nevertheless he 
holds that theories can be tested by observations. This is because the theories assumed by the 
observation-statements that report the results of some experiment will generally be different from the 
theory that the experiment is testing. For example, Newton conducted various experiments with a 
glass prism to test his theory that white light is made up of coloured light. The result of the 
experiment can be reported by an observation-statement: 'When light is shone into one side of a glass 
prism rays of red, green and purple light can be seen on the other side'. This description is theory-
laden. Calling something a 'glass prism', for example, assumes that the prism is actually made from a 
particular substance. However, the theories assumed by the description do not include Newton's 
theory of light. The observation-statements are independent of this particular theory and so can test it. 
  
Nagel's suggestion implies that scientists with different theoretical orientations can often mean 
the same thing by their observation statements. So long as the theories assumed by a description do 
not include those theories about which the scientists disagree, their differing theoretical beliefs will 
not lead to any difference in meaning. Communication does not need to be theory free but just neutral 
between the theories under debate. At this point it can be seen that the D.S.M. committee were wrong 
to describe their classification system as 'atheoretical'.
[25]
 Still, it may yet be possible for it to be 
theory-neutral. 
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3.3 Problems with deciding where to look. 
  
Commonly it is claimed that phenomena are too numerous and too rich for a scientist to be able to set 
about observing everything. Someone who is attracted to this line of argument will claim that 
classification systems must draw on some theory or another, as a theory must be used to decide which 
features of the entities under study are of scientific interest.  
  
Although philosophers generally accept that scientists require a theory to help them decide 
what to observe, there is a tradition in taxonomy that denies that this is the case. Proponents of 
numerical taxonomy sometimes deny that scientists must be selective with regard to the features of 
entities they consider in constructing classification systems.
[26]
 Here I will assess this claim.
 
  
The numerical methods most often used in the creation of categorical classification systems 
(such as the D.S.M.) are cluster analytic techniques. Data is collected on many variables of the 
entities being analysed. This data is then plotted in multi-dimensional space. Similar entities end up 
being close together on the plot, and the distance between any two entities is a measure of their 
average similarity. A classification can then be extracted by searching for 'clusters', groups of highly 
similar entities. 
  
Cluster analysts have sometimes held that any and all variables can be included in the 
analysis, and that thus an analyst who uses many variables can succeed in obtaining an atheoretical 
classification system.
[27]
 Is this claim true? I suggest not. The problem is that the clusters found in 
the analysis depend on the variables analysed, but knowledge of the natural structure of the domain 
would require knowledge of the true similarities and differences between the various properties of the 
entities in the domain. Unfortunately, it is quite possible for us to miss the mark and choose variables 
that do not correspond to true properties. Thus, almost certainly 'distance from my desk', or more 
seriously, 'being a schizophrenogenic mother', are variables that fail to measure genuine properties.
[28]
 Only if the cluster analyst's variables measure genuine properties will the clusters obtained 
reflect the natural structure of the domain. An analyst who wants to pick variables that measure 
genuine properties must rely on the current best scientific theories. As such, a theory is needed to 
guide the choice of variables, and as a consequence cluster analysis cannot be used to produce 
atheoretical classification systems. 
  
Might it be possible to use Nagel's suggestion again at this point? Although the selection of 
variables that measure genuine properties requires some theory, might it be possible to use a theory 
that is not amongst those about which different mental health professionals disagree? Unfortunately 
not. In a cluster analysis of psychopathology, biologically orientated psychiatrists will want to include 
biological variables but may well consider variables linked to 'defence styles' to be suspicious. 
Psychiatrists adhering to different theoretical frameworks will disagree. We can conclude that, 
contrary to the claims of some of its proponents, cluster analysis is not a technique that can be used to 
construct atheoretical classification systems.  
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If the D.S.M. cannot be theory-free what theory does it use? I suggest, as have many writers 
before me, that the D.S.M. tacitly assumes that some biological account of mental illness will prove 
to be correct. The Sourcebook published alongside the D.S.M.-IV reveals that the studies appealed to 
by the D.S.M. committees are mainly biological in orientation. These studies examine, for example, 
the biological correlates of disorder, they assess whether drug treatments differentially affect different 
groups of patients, they look at whether disorders run in families, and at whether particular disorders 
tend to affect people of a particular age and sex. Unfortunately, biological accounts of mental illness 
are by no mean uncontroversial. As the D.S.M. tacitly assumes some biological explanation for 
mental disorder, the D.S.M. categories stand, or quite possibly fall, with such an account.  
  
4. The D.S.M. and feedback in applied science 
  
If the D.S.M. is affected by pressures that arise from the ways in which it is used this may be another 
reason for being suspicious of its categories. Here, I examine the ways in which the D.S.M. has been 
affected by its use as a nomenclature for completing medical insurance forms. I ask whether such 
feedback makes it more or less likely that D.S.M. categories will correspond to natural kinds of 
disorder. 
  
4.1 Insurance and the D.S.M. 
  
Since the late 1960s it has been standard practice for medical insurance companies to request a 
D.S.M. diagnosis before they will consider reimbursing for psychiatric treatment. Those responsible 
for the most recent editions of the D.S.M. claim to have been entirely uninfluenced by insurance 
considerations.
[29]
 I will argue that this is not true and that the D.S.M. has been and continues to be 
affected by pressures stemming from medical insurance.   
  
a.      Pressures to include new diagnoses in the D.S.M 
  
The fact that third-party payers only reimburse treatment for patients with a D.S.M. diagnosis 
provides an incentive for psychiatrists and patients to lobby for new disorders to be included in the 
D.S.M. When such lobbying is successful new diagnoses come to be included in the D.S.M. as a 
direct result of insurance pressures. In The Harmony of Illusions Alan Young argues that Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder was included in D.S.M.-III partly as a result of such lobbying. As the 
Veteran's Administration pays for the treatment of all combat related disorders, the inclusion of 
P.T.S.D. in the D.S.M. enabled thousands of mentally disturbed Vietnam veterans to obtain treatment 
in V.A. centres. 
  
Less successfully, family therapists have been lobbying since the 1970s to have diagnoses 
suitable for describing the family problems they treat included in the D.S.M. This lobbying is 
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explicitly motivated by a desire to obtain insurance coverage for their patients.
[30]
 To date 
family diagnoses are not included in the D.S.M. The interactional model of mental illness adopted by 
family therapists is radically different to the medical/biological approach adopted by the D.S.M., 
making the development of D.S.M.-style family diagnoses extremely difficult. However, attempts to 
get such diagnoses included continue. 
  
Once a diagnosis is included in the D.S.M. the diagnostic criteria may be altered between 
editions so that more or fewer patients fall into the category. The Sourcebook that accompanies the 
D.S.M.-IV documents many of the decisions made by the various Working Groups. Occasionally the 
Sourcebook records cases where the Working Groups considered altering diagnostic criteria in order 
to make it easier for patients to obtain reimbursement. For example, the Working Group examining 
Major Depression with a Seasonal Pattern state that 'In favour of broadening criteria are the following 
considerations...there is a need for reimbursement availability for phototherapy without waiting for a 
third episode.'
[31]
 Similarly, the Working Group on Post Traumatic Stress Disorder note that 
'requiring a minimum duration before a diagnosis of P.T.S.D. could be made might reduce help-
seeking behaviour as well as reimbursement for treatment'.
[32]
 The mechanisms of insurance 
coverage create pressures for the D.S.M. to find diagnoses for more and more patients. 
  
b. Pressures to massage diagnoses. 
  
Insurance coverage also creates incentives for psychiatrists to massage the diagnoses of individual 
patients. Psychiatrists may wish to protect patients from stigma, and thus record less severe diagnoses 
than would be justified. Alternatively, they may over-emphasise how sick their patients are in order to 
justify treatment.  
  
In the 1960s and 70s insurance forms were generally returned via the patient's employer or by 
the patient, thus psychiatrists avoided recording severe or socially unacceptable diagnoses.
[33]
 A 
1977 study comparing insurance claim and confidential diagnoses found that 5.4% of the patients 
were schizophrenic according to the insurance forms compared with 10.4% according to the 






More recently, insurance companies have introduced a range of measures designed to reduce 
their costs and it has become increasingly difficult to obtain reimbursement for mental health care. 
Many of the cost-cutting measures introduced by insurance companies make the diagnosis a patient 
receives of crucial importance in determining the care a patient receives. For example, peer-review 
physicians employed by insurance companies will consider whether the proposed treatment is 
appropriate given the diagnosis recorded, and Health Maintenance Organisations tend to make the 
number of sessions of care provided depend on the diagnosis a patient receives. 
  
Such practices encourage psychiatrists to record more severe diagnoses. There is some 
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evidence that mental health professionals have started to respond to these financial incentives. 
A 1988 survey of social workers found that 59% admitted using mental disorder diagnoses for 
insurance purposes even when they were unwarranted clinically, and 86% diagnosed individual 





In addition, I hypothesise that economic and social considerations can influence the diagnoses 
psychiatrists make more subtly than by encouraging them to make fraudulent diagnoses. Many 
patients are borderline between several diagnoses. Financial and social incentives will have an effect 
when a psychiatrist who could equally well make one of several diagnoses is motivated to favour one 
possible diagnosis over the others. When finding cases of a particular type is rewarded, cases of that 
kind will be found. Over time diagnostic boundaries will change, as once one case is perceived as a 
case of, say, major depression, similar cases encountered later will come to be grouped with it. 
Sometimes official diagnostic criteria will be altered as a result, and even when no changing in the 
wording of criteria occurs, the effective boundaries of the category may still expand or shrink, as 
criteria can come to be interpreted more or less strictly. In this way the use of D.S.M. diagnoses in 
completing insurance forms leads to new pressures on diagnosis that in time can feedback and have 
an effect on accepted diagnostic criteria.  
  
4.2 The epistemic significance of feedback  
  
I have shown that pressures arising from medical insurance can affect the D.S.M. How might such 
feedback affect the chances that D.S.M. categories will correspond to natural kinds of disorder?  
  
Unfortunately, the feedback that arises from the use of the D.S.M. in completing insurance 
forms is almost certainly a bad thing epistemically speaking. The basic problem is that the success of 
the practice of using 'schizophrenia', 'major depression', and so on to complete insurance forms does 
not require the diagnoses given to be valid. From the point of view of the patient and psychiatrist all 
that matters is that the insurance company pays for the treatment. Whether they do this doesn't require 
that patients actually have the diagnosed disorder, but only that the insurance company believes that 
they do.  
  
Even from the point of view of the insurance company there is no direct link between 
insurance being a success (that is, the insurance company making profits) and patients receiving valid 
diagnoses. In order to make a profit the insurance company needs to be able to predict the average 
cost of patient care. However, the cost of patient care is only weakly correlated with diagnosis. 
McCrone and Phelan (1994) found that diagnosis predicted only 3% in the variation in length of 
hospital stay, and conclude 'Diagnosis, even when clearly defined, is a poor indication of resource 
utilisation'.
[36]
 As diagnosis is only weakly correlated with the cost of care, whether insurance 
companies make a profit will not depend on patients receiving accurate diagnoses. Rather it appears 
that the requirement that patients receive a particular diagnosis to qualify for treatment is just used as 
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a means of restricting the number of patients who qualify. So long as only a few people are 
diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia, say, it doesn't matter whether or not those who are so 
diagnosed are actually schizophrenic. As the success of using the D.S.M. to complete insurance forms 
is largely independent of the validity of the diagnoses made, there is no reason to expect that 
pressures that arise from the desire to make the process of filling in insurance forms work better (for 
the patient, psychiatrist, or insurance company) will lead to diagnoses being more valid. 
  
Once it has been decided that feedback arising from the use of the D.S.M. for completing 
insurance forms is epistemically undesirable the question arises as to whether, and if so how, such 
feedback can be controlled. I suggest that the mechanisms via which feedback operates should not be 
thought of as being occult, and that there is no reason why they cannot be discovered and measures be 
introduced to counter-act them. 
  
Feedback that arises from the use of D.S.M. categories for completing insurance forms could 
be limited in various ways. Much diagnostic creep arises because a psychiatrist is faced with a patient 
who is borderline between several equally appropriate diagnoses one of which carries more practical 
benefits than the others. Thus diagnostic creep can be controlled by minimising the proportion of 
cases in which psychiatrists will be torn between alternative categories. This route is already being 
adopted by the creators of Health Resource Groups (H.R.G.s), the British version of Diagnostic 
Related Groups, which are designed to facilitate financial planning within the N.H.S. Early versions 
of H.R.G.s distinguished between psychotic and neurotic depression, a distinction where there were 
many borderline cases. On finding that the use of codes for these diagnoses was 'particularly 
idiosyncratic',
[37]
 it was decided to abandon this distinction. Later versions of H.R.G.s distinguish 
between depressed patients who are 'sectioned' (that is, legally detained because they are believed to 
pose a threat to themselves or others) and those who are voluntary patients. Splitting categories on the 
grounds of such 'hard' criteria will reduce diagnostic creep.  
  
The pressures on psychiatric classification that arise from its use by insurance companies can 
also be reduced by limiting the practical consequences of diagnosis. For example, as we have seen, in 
the 1960s and 70s many psychiatrists recorded less severe diagnoses on insurance forms for fear that 
the forms would be seen by patients or their employers. Feedback that results from such practices 
could have been stopped by changing the system by which insurance was paid so that the patient's 
employer did not return the forms to the insurance company.  
  
There is nothing occult about the feedback mechanisms that I have described. Their 
mechanisms can be discovered and it will often be possible to introduce measures to limit their effect. 
In the case of the D.S.M., however, such measures are not being taken. As we have seen, far from 
trying to prevent the D.S.M. being affected by insurance considerations the D.S.M. committee 
knowingly alters the classification scheme for insurance purposes. This makes it less likely that 
D.S.M. categories will describe natural kinds of disorder.  
  




I have argued that whether a condition is a disorder is partly a value-judgement. Nevertheless, at least 
some of those conditions that are generally considered to be mental disorders are plausibly natural 
kinds. However, while there may well be natural kinds of mental disorder we should not expect the 
D.S.M. to tell us what they are. Classification is theory-laden and thus the D.S.M. can only be as good 
as current psychiatric theory. In addition, I have shown that pressures stemming from medical 
insurance can affect the D.S.M. Plausibly, the D.S.M. will also be affected by pressures that emerge 
from the ways in which it is used in other contexts. I conclude that the categories of the D.S.M. are 
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